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Abstract
Using a hedonic wage-amenity model, this paper examines the valuation of medical inputs into the production of
health. The data used in this study include the incomes, demographics and measures of human capital for
households in eastern North Carolina with county level medical input supply. These data allow an estimate of the
marginal value of medical care inputs such as the physician to population ratio and the availability of specialized
services in an area of the country where the lack of available medical care has been of particular concern to policy
makers. Our results indicate that while health care inputs are not a signi®cant determinant of earnings overall, they
are important in counties that have been designated as medically underserved. In underserved counties each
additional physician per 10,000 individuals in the county decreases earnings by about 11.6%. This suggests that
physicians act as an amenity and workers are willing to accept lower wages to locate in counties with a higher
physician to population ratio. # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Hedonic; Amenity; Health production; Medical inputs

Introduction
The assumption underlying the hedonic wage model
is that workers prefer jobs with more pleasant working
conditions. The greater supply of workers for pleasant
jobs will lower the wage in these jobs and, in equilibrium, the dierence in wages between two jobs will
re¯ect the workers' marginal valuation of the dierence
in working conditions. Firms have dierent isopro®t
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curves and thus their willingness to provide pleasant or
productivity enhancing job characteristics will vary.
Similarly, dierent workers have dierent preferences
and there is a non-random sorting of workers and
®rms. If working conditions are uncorrelated with productivities, ®rms with a low cost of producing pleasant
conditions will tend to be matched with workers with
a stronger preference for these conditions, while ®rms
with a high cost of producing pleasant conditions will
tend to attract workers with a lower preference for
these characteristics. Thus, since the resulting hedonic
wage function is an envelope of isopro®t and iso-utility
curves the resulting compensating dierential re¯ects
the preferences of the marginal worker and the marginal eect on ®rm pro®t.
One practical application of this model is the valuation of the environmental and social amenities that
vary across regions. This paper examines the valuation

0277-9536/00/$ - see front matter # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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of inputs into the production of health. Inputs into
health production, such as environmental health amenities and the availability of medical care services, will
tend to attract workers and ®rms, due to the enhancement of labor productivity and the amenity value to
consumers and either increase or decrease wages,
depending on the relative size of the two eects. If the
value of the marginal product of the amenity is greater
than the willingness to pay for the amenity, then wages
will rise; and vice versa.
Hospital services, nursing home services and other
medical services are quasi-public goods. Non-pro®t
health care enterprises may arise where a sucient
minority of voters is dissatis®ed with the market's and
government's level of provision (Weisbrod, 1975,
1988). High quality hospitals and doctors may also
enhance a community's sense of pride and well being.
They may indirectly provide bene®ts to local business
by improving labor productivity. In addition, excess
hospital capacity provides insurance for the currently
healthy citizens in that a bed will be available should
they need one. Thus, while these components of the
bene®ts of medical care are likely to be rather signi®cant, it is not likely that their economic value will be
fully re¯ected in market prices.
To the extent that managed care has de-emphasized
the use of physicians and hospitals and tends to use
more nurse practitioners and physician assistants the
public good component of medical care may have
diminished. In addition, physicians serve rural areas by
doing rotations into outlying areas rather than living
in them and better roads, helicopter ambulances and
telemedicine all tend to reduce the value of physicians
and hospitals which are located in the local county.
The implication is that while traditional medical inputs
may still be important, their contribution is not as
great as they were prior to the rise of managed care
and the reduced transportation costs. Thus, the results
found in this paper using data from the early 1990s are
likely to ®nd a smaller impact of medical care inputs
than a study using older data. We test for these changing eects below by splitting our data into two time
periods and examining dierences.
There have been relatively few hedonic wage studies
that considered health amenities. Blomquist et al.
(1988) estimate housing and wage hedonic equations in
the context of an urban quality of life study and ®nd
that health-related environmental disamenities, such as
Superfund sites, are capitalized in both land and labor
markets. Clark and Kahn (1989), in the context of a
recreational ®shing valuation study, ®nd that, holding

constant housing prices, the number of physicians in
an urban area has no eect on wages. Gyourko and
Tracy (1991) ®nd that the number of hospital beds is a
valued publicly provided good in the wage equation
but does not aect the housing price. These studies use
national, urban data.
This paper diers from previous research in two important ways. First, our data contain a broader range
of medical inputs than utilized in previous research
that may be considered as local amenities and those
that increase worker productivity. This will allow us to
examine the eects of omitting these variables. Also,
we focus on a particular problem with medical care
access: access to medical care in an underserved, rural
area (Goetz and Debertin, 1996)2. The data used in
this study include the incomes, demographics and
measures of human capital for over 3000 households
in eastern North Carolina with county level medical
care inputs. Using a hedonic wage model, these data
allow an estimate of the marginal value of medical
care inputs such as the physician to population ratio,
number and size of hospitals and the availability of
specialized services in an area of the country where the
lack of available health care has been of particular
concern to policy makers.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays
out the theory behind the hedonic wage model. We
then describe the data used in the paper and present
descriptive statistics. The fourth section presents our
results and conclusions follow in the ®nal section.
Theory
Our modeling approach begins with utility and
health production functions, which are then integrated
into a hedonic model of wages and rents. We assume
individuals possess a utility function of the following
form:
u  u X,H,S 

where u(.) is the utility function, X is a vector of market goods, H is the housing commodity and S is individual health status, measured as annual sick days.
Utility is increasing in the composite commodity, the
housing commodity and decreasing in sick days. Sick
days decrease utility by decreasing the number of days
spent engaged in utility producing activities.
Individual health status is endogenous and can be
produced according to the health production function:
S  s Q, M 

2
The use of `underserved' here refers to a need-based shortage as de®ned by Lee and Jones (1993) and not necessarily an
economic shortage.

1

2

where Q is a vector of medical care inputs priced in
markets, SQ < 0 and M is a vector of unpriced medical care inputs, SM < 0. In addition to the public good
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Fig. 1. The determination of wages and rents.

nature of medical care mentioned above, a signi®cant
portion of the full cost of medical care inputs, especially in underserved rural areas, is the unpriced
opportunity cost of travel time for access to medical
care. In this respect, access to medical care inputs is a
quasi-public good. The full costs of medical care inputs
are inversely related with access.
We integrate the health production function into a
hedonic model, which is based on the models of
Blomquist et al. (1988), Clark and Kahn (1989) and
Gyourko and Tracy (1991). These models are based on
the hedonic price models of Rosen (1974) and Roback
(1982). After substitution of (2) into (1), households
are assumed to possess indirect utility functions v(.) of
the form
v r,w,M   max u X,H,s Q,M 
s:t:w  PX X  PQ Q  rH  hS

3

where w is annual income, Pi are vectors of market
prices, i=X,Q and h is the opportunity cost of sick
days. Indirect utility is decreasing in the land rent,
increasing in income and medical inputs. Market prices
are assumed constant and suppressed for simplicity.
Business ®rms are assumed to possess production
functions of the form
X  X L ÿ S,H 

4

where X(.) is the production function, LÿS is the
labor input net sick days and H is the land input. The
capital input is suppressed for simplicity. Output is
increasing in the inputs. After substitution of (2) into
(4), business ®rms are assumed to possess indirect
pro®t functions of the form
P r,w,M   max PX X L ÿ s Q,M ,H  ÿ wL ÿ rH

5

where P(.) is the indirect pro®t function which is
3
For an empirical example of the overall positive eect of
amenities on wages in the context of public infrastructure and
wages, see Dalenberg and Partridge (1997).
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decreasing in r and w. Medical care inputs have a positive eect on pro®t by increasing the productivity of
the labor input. The output price, PX, is assumed constant and suppressed in the indirect pro®t function for
simplicity.
The unpriced medical care inputs can become capitalized in both land and labor markets. To see this, consider the graphical model in Fig. 1 of the indierence
and isopro®t curves in r,w space. With mobility in the
long run, household utility and ®rm pro®ts will be
equalized across locations. Incomes and rents will be
determined in the markets after sorting among workers
and ®rms take place. The initial equilibrium, point a,
summarizes these prices. Improvements in medical care
inputs has a positive direct eect on rents and a negative direct eect on wages as workers enjoy higher utility levels, v2 > v1 and move to the counties with these
characteristics, equilibrium b. Pro®ts for business ®rms
are also greater in the attractive locations; so, as ®rms
move to these areas land rents increase further.
Depending on the size of the productivity eect on
®rm pro®ts, wages may be negatively (equilibrium c )
or positively (equilibrium d ), aected by ®rm location
decisions3.
Solving the indirect utility function, Eq. (3) and
indirect pro®t function, Eq. (5), for r and w, equating
these functions and solving for equilibrium wage and
land rents, respectively, yields reduced form wage and
rent equations in which these prices depend entirely on
medical care inputs w'=w(M), r'=r(M) where w' and
r ' are the equilibrium prices for homogeneous households.

Empirical speci®cation
Our data contain no information on household
speci®c land rents or housing prices in which to
measure the hedonic price function. Therefore, we
assume that the equilibrium wage function includes a
measure of land rent in order to hold the eect of
housing markets on wages constant across locations.
The empirical speci®cation of our model is
ln wi  bMi  ari  dKi  gNi  mi

6

where ln wi is the log of annual income for household
i. K is a vector of human capital and other demographic variables including education, experience and
its square, the number of children in the household
and dummy variables for race (2), gender, marital status (2), year of survey (4) and full-time status. ri is the
average of the log housing value for individual i's
county. As in typical hedonic wage models, local
characteristics, N, are controlled for with a series of
variables including local government per pupil expendi-

physicians to population ratio (in 10,000s)
the number of pediatric ICU Short-Term Hospital Beds
the natural log of median housing value by county
years of schooling completed
potential experience (age minus schooling minus six)
dummy variable equal to one if African American
dummy variable equal to one if not white or black
dummy variable equal to one if female
dummy variable equal to one if the worker designates themselves as a full time worker
dummy variable equal to one if married, spouse present
dummy variable equal to 1 if divorced, separated, or widowed
number of children in the household
number of violent crimes per capita (in 000s)
1992 per pupil expenditures by county (in 000s)

Per capita physiciansa
Pediatric ICU hospital bedsa
Log housing valueb
Schoolc
Experiencec
Blackc
Other Racec
Femalec
Full-timec
Marriedc
Divorced, separated or widowedc
Childrenc
Crime rated
Per pupil expendituresd

b

Area resource ®le (Bureau of Health Professions).
The East Book, ECU Regional Development Services.
c
ECU Annual Survey of Eastern North Carolina.
d
US City-County Data Book.

a

Description

Variable

Table 1
Data de®nitions

1.23
4.87
10.94
13.16
26.47
0.25
0.05
0.52
0.64
0.58
0.24
1.50
3.78
4.12

Mean
(S.D.)
(2.48)
(11.31)
(0.18)
(2.03)
(15.29)
(0.43)
(0.21)
(0.50)
(0.48)
(0.49)
(0.43)
(1.24)
(4.23)
(0.24)

510
E.J. Schumacher, J.C. Whitehead / Social Science & Medicine 50 (2000) 507±515

E.J. Schumacher, J.C. Whitehead / Social Science & Medicine 50 (2000) 507±515

511

Table 2
Maximum likelihood estimates of earnings equations dependent variable: log of income group cutosa
Variable

1

2

Constant
Per capita physicians
Pediatric ICU hospital beds
Underserved county
Underserved  physpop
Underserved  PICU Beds
Log(housing value)
School
Experience
Experience2/100
Black
Other Race
Female
Married
Divorced, separated or widowed
Children
Work full-time
Crime rate
Per pupil expenditures
1992
1993
1994
1995
Sample size
Sigma
Log-likelihood
w 2 for joint signi®cance of physicians and beds

ÿ6.551 (0.637)
0.007 (0.010)
0.002 (0.002)
±
±
±
0.174 (0.054)
0.115 (0.005)
0.021 (0.002)
ÿ0.039 (0.004)
ÿ0.291 (0.023)
ÿ0.129 (0.044)
ÿ0.071 (0.019)
0.434 (0.028)
ÿ0.157 (0.031)
0.039 (0.008)
0.178 (0.020)
ÿ0.008 (0.006)
ÿ0.055 (0.042)
ÿ0.109 (0.030)
ÿ0.105 (0.030)
ÿ0.059 (0.030)
0.000 (0.029)
3369
0.509 (0.007)
ÿ5730.052
1.154

ÿ7.551 (0.743)
0.014 (0.013)
ÿ0.003 (0.003)
ÿ0.063 (0.030)
ÿ0.123 (0.045)
0.024 (0.009)
0.087 (0.066)
0.114 (0.005)
0.021 (0.002)
ÿ0.038 (0.004)
ÿ0.294 (0.023)
ÿ0.127 (0.045)
ÿ0.072 (0.019)
0.439 (0.028)
ÿ0.156 (0.031)
0.040 (0.008)
0.176 (0.020)
0.014 (0.009)
ÿ0.070 (0.044)
ÿ0.107 (0.030)
ÿ0.103 (0.030)
ÿ0.058 (0.030)
0.000 (0.029)
3369
0.508 (0.007)
ÿ5719.09
23.976

a
Results are maximum likelihood estimates of the grouped data model where the dependent variable is the log of the income
group cutos. Standard errors in parentheses.  indicates signi®cance at the 5% level.

ture and the rate of violent crime. Medical care amenities (M ) potentially include such variables as hospital
beds, the per capita number of physicians and availability of specialty services4. Finally, m is a wellbehaved error term5.
The wage-amenity model can be used to estimate
non-market values for unpriced amenities. In this
paper we assume a log±linear functional form of the
model to be consistent with human capital theory
(Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1993). The coecient estimates,
therefore, can be interpreted as log wage dierentials,
or approximate percentage dierentials6. The focus of
4
Our ®nal speci®cation of Eq. (6) includes per capita physicians and the number of pediatric intensive care beds in the
county.
5
We also included environmental amenity variables such as
the natural log of pounds of hazardous waste generated by
county or distance to the nearest major beach. None of these
variables, however, were signi®cantly dierent from zero in
any of the model speci®cations.
6
The coecients are converted to percentage changes by
the formula (ebÿ1)  100, where b is the coecient estimate.

this paper will be on the coecient vector b, which
will indicate the eect of various health care amenities
on household income.

The data
The household level data are from 1991 through
1995 annual telephone surveys of eastern North
Carolina households. The surveys used a random digit
dialing sampling scheme with response rates of at least
70% in each year. Our data do not contain information on hours worked or hourly wages, rather the
interviewer asks individuals to place themselves in one
of eight income categories. The income categories (in
1995 dollars) are: less than $10,000 (10.5% of the
sample); between $10,001 and 15,000 (12.1% of the
sample); between $15,001 and 20,000 (12.6%); between
$20,001 and 25,000 (11.4%); between $25,001 and
30,000 (11.2%); between $30,001 and 50,000 (25.1%);
between $50,001 and 75,000 (12.3%); and greater than
$75,000 (4.8%). We omit those who did not list working as their primary activity, so that those who are
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enrolled in school and working or who are not in the
labor force are deleted from the sample. The sample
yields observations on 3369 households in the 41 counties that make up eastern North Carolina7.
Table 1 provides variable descriptions and means of
all variables used in the ®nal wage-amenity models. On
average there are 1.23 physicians per 10,000 individuals
in the counties and there are almost 5 pediatric ICU
beds in each county. About 30% of the sample are
non-white and almost 60% are currently married.
Estimation results
Since the income data is reported only by large categories, ordinary least squares regression estimates,
employing the midpoints of the categories, will be
biased (Stewart, 1983). Therefore, we use the maximum likelihood interval estimates from the
GROUPED data command in LIMDEP (Greene,
1995) to obtain unbiased coecient estimates. Table 2
displays the maximum likelihood estimates. Although
the main focus of the paper is the impact of medical
care inputs on earnings, the eect of the other independent variables are of interest. Schooling and experience
are important determinants of earnings as these are the
main measures of human capital in our model. Each
year of schooling adds about 12% to family income.
As is typical for an earnings equation, experience
increases earnings at a decreasing rate. After controlling for other measurable characteristics, blacks and
females earn substantially less than white males (about
25 and 7% respectively)8. This is a larger wage dierence than obtained from most studies examining the
impact of race on the entire labor market (Hirsch and
Macpherson, 1994). Higher earnings are associated
with marriage consistent with previous literature, however, single workers are estimated to earn more than
previously married individuals. This later result is contrary to previous literature (Korenmen and Neumark,
1991). There is also a wage dierential for the presence
of children, which may capture investments in human
capital. Earnings are highest in 1991 (the omitted year)
and are lowest in 1992 and 1993, but return to their
1991 levels by 1995.
The wage-amenity speci®cation in column 1 of Table
2 includes the per capita physician ratio and the number of pediatric intensive care unit beds. With the
other variables held constant, both of these medical
care inputs have an insigni®cant eect on earnings.

7
Table 4 provides a list of these counties as well as descriptive information about each county.
8
The log point dierence of ÿ0.291 is converted into a percentage dierence by (eÿ0.291ÿ1)  100=ÿ25.2%.

The critical value for the w 2 test of joint signi®cance
for these two variables is 1.154 which implies that they
are not jointly signi®cant.
These ®ndings imply that the health care inputs are
not an important determinant of earnings. An alternative, though unlikely, explanation is that the productivity eect just osets the amenity eect of health
care inputs and thus the net eect is zero. Since eastern
North Carolina has been singled out as a `medically
underserved' area of the county, this ®nding is signi®cant. Before we conclude that health care inputs do
not matter, however, we explore the underserved area
eects a little more closely. Not all counties in this
area are medically underserved. A number of counties
have been designated as Health Professional Shortage
Areas (HPSAs). A ratio of one primary care physician
per 3500 people is used to designate a HPSA (Project
East, 1993). Appendix Table 4 indicates that 18 of the
41 counties in the region have been designated as
medically underserved.
Column 2 of Table 2 displays the results of including
a dummy variable for a medically underserved county
and the eects of interacting this variable with the health
care inputs. The results show that while there appears to
be no overall eect of health care inputs on earnings,
there is a rather large eect in counties that have been
deemed medically underserved. The critical value for the
w 2 test of joint signi®cance for the medical inputs and
the two interaction terms is 23.98, which is highly signi®cant. Workers in counties that are underserved
receive earnings about 6% lower than workers in other
counties, all things equal. This is likely capturing the
relatively worse economic conditions in these counties
(note that the coecient on the log housing value
decreases and is no longer signi®cant).
The coecients on the interaction terms indicate
that medical inputs are important determinants of
earnings in underserved areas. The eect of physicians
is signi®cantly negative in underserved areas suggesting
that the amenity component of physicians overwhelms
any productivity eect. Each additional physician per
10,000 individuals in the county decreases earnings by
about 10.3% (0.014ÿ0.123=ÿ0.109 log points), holding all other variables constant. Pediatric ICU beds,
on the other hand, are estimated to be a productivity
enhancing characteristic. Each additional pediatric
ICU bed is estimated to increase earnings by about
2.1% (ÿ0.003+0.024=0.021 log points). A priori, one
might expect the presence of a pediatric ICU to appear
as only an amenity since it is unlikely that this medical
service could directly aect worker productivity. It
may be, however, that this variable rather than indicating the direct eect of a pediatric ICU is capturing
other characteristics of a hospital. That is, for example,
hospitals with higher quality facilities or doctors is
likely to be considered a productivity-enhancing
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Table 3
Separate eects by racea
Variable

White

Nonwhite

Per capita physicians
0.007 (0.016)
0.050 (0.027)
Pediatric ICU hospital beds ÿ0.005 (0.004)
0.006 (0.006)
Underserved county
ÿ0.054 (0.037) ÿ0.061 (0.057)
Underserved  physpop
ÿ0.124 (0.052) ÿ0.052 (0.114)
Underserved  PICU beds
0.025 (0.010) ÿ0.004 (0.024)
a
Shown are the coecients on health inputs estimated separately by race. Other than the variables shown, other variables included in the regression are the same as in Table 2
with the exception of the race dummies.  indicates the coecient is signi®cant at the 5% level.

characteristic and these hospitals also are likely to provide pediatric ICU care.
A potential problem with our model speci®cation is
that doctors and hospital beds may be endogenous.
Doctors and hospitals may be attracted to areas where
wages are higher and thus treating them as exogenous
may lead to biased estimates of the eects of these
variables on earnings. We test for the endogeneity of
physicians and beds using the technique of Blundell
and Smith (1986) adapted to the interval regression
and ®nd no evidence for endogeneity. We ®rst estimate
a county level model for physician and bed location.
This model is identi®ed using county-level characteristics. These models have R2 values greater than 0.70
for both models. We then include the residuals from
these models in the individual income equation. A signi®cant coecient on this residual would lead one to
conclude that there is evidence of endogeneity bias.
The coecients on the residuals are not signi®cantly
dierent from zero (asymptotic t-values=0.86, 0.23).
Thus, these results suggest that there is no evidence of
endogeneity and estimating the Grouped data model
including physicians and beds on the right-hand-side
will not lead to biased coecient estimates.
Wage-amenity models including other medical care
inputs as alternative independent variables performed
less well than the speci®cation shown in Table 2. For
example, including such variables as the number of primary care physicians, the number of emergency rooms,
the presence of an open heart surgery unit, or a
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dummy variable equal to one if the county had at least
one open heart unit, pediatric intensive care unit, or
angioplasty unit were generally insigni®cant in the
earnings equations. This suggests that while previous
studies examining the hedonic value of medical care
inputs may not have had access to detailed health care
input variables, it appears that their results are not
biased by these omissions9.
Table 3 displays speci®cations run separately for
whites and nonwhites. There are surprisingly large
dierences in the eects of medical care inputs between
the white and nonwhite population. The results for
whites are similar to those for the population. Separate
estimates for nonwhites indicate that while there is not
a distinct underserved county eect, the eect of physicians is positive and signi®cant. Each additional physician per 10,000 individuals in the county increases
nonwhite family income by about 5%, while the eect
for white families is negative and only appears in
underserved counties. Also, according to the likelihood-ratio test, the vector of coecients for whites is
signi®cantly dierent from the coecient vector for
nonwhites (w 2=111.91[15 d.f.]).
While the small sample size for nonwhites
(n = 1000) make ®rm conclusions dicult, these ®ndings suggest that medical inputs have a substantially
larger productivity enhancing eect for nonwhites than
for whites. This ®nding is consistent with empirical
®ndings on the production of health which concludes
that the marginal product of medical care inputs on individual health are typically much stronger for blacks
than for whites (Corman et al., 1987; Hadley 1988;
Folland et al., 1997). Since the marginal product of
medical care is higher for blacks than whites, it follows
that the marginal impact of medical care inputs on
earnings will be higher for blacks as well. If this were
the case, however, one may expect that this eect
would be stronger in underserved areas. We do not see
this. An alternative explanation could be that the productivity eects are similar, but whites place a higher
value on medical care amenities than non-whites.
Whatever the explanation, it is clear from these results
that there are distinct dierences in the way medical
inputs aect white and nonwhite individuals.
Conclusions

9
We also examined the possibility that the public good
component of medical care may have diminished over the
period due to the rise of managed care and lowered transportation costs. If large changes occurred over the period, we
should ®nd large dierences between the early years of the
sample and the later years. We estimated separate models for
the years 1991±1992 and the years 1993±1995. We ®nd that
there is no evidence for change over the period. The coecient estimates are virtually identical for both sub-periods.

This paper is concerned with the eects of medical
care inputs on primarily rural household incomes.
Because of the quasi-public good nature of medical
care inputs, it is dicult to measure the full price or
value of these inputs. The approach taken here is to
estimate a hedonic wage function, which relates the
earnings of workers to a particular labor market or
local area characteristics. Medical care inputs are
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found to have an insigni®cant eect on earnings for
the region as a whole, but there are signi®cant eects
in counties that have been designated as medically
underserved. The physician to population ratio in
medically underserved counties is found to be a utility
enhancing characteristic. Each physician per 10,000 individuals in the population decreases earnings by
about 12%. The number of pediatric intensive care
beds, however, appears as a small productivity-enhancing characteristic. This variable is likely capturing an
overall prestige value of the hospital. We also ®nd evidence that the productivity component of health care
inputs is stronger for blacks than for whites.
Our results are suggestive for a number of reasons.
First, our study is the ®rst to include more highly
detailed controls for medical care inputs, allowing us
to probe deeper into the eect of medical care inputs
on incomes. It appears that previous studies including
only limited health care inputs are not seriously biased.
Second, our study is the ®rst to focus on a rural area
in which policy makers have been concerned with the
underprovision of medical services10. It appears that
there are distinct dierences between the eects of
medical inputs in areas that are deemed medically
underserved. The results suggest that these services are
highly valued by ®rms and workers in the region and
have policy implications for the economic development
of poor, rural regions. For example, if ®rms value
medical care inputs when they make location decisions
and poor areas are underserved in terms of inputs, this
puts a binding constraint on the economic development of the poor region.
A common ®nding in the health production literature is that while the marginal product of health care
is relatively low for the population as a whole, it is signi®cantly larger for certain subgroups (Hadley, 1982,
1988). Our ®ndings are consistent with this conclusion.
Previous studies examining the impact of physician
inputs on wages typically ®nd that they are negatively
correlated (Gyourko and Tracy, 1991). Our ®nding
that there is a positive wage eect of physicians for
blacks suggests that there is a strong productivity eect
for this group of workers, consistent with the marginal
product of health care being relatively large for this
group of workers.
These results also suggest avenues for further
research. Most wage-amenity models employ urban
data while our data is for a rural region. Since there
are signi®cant concerns about the rural location decisions for physicians, models that include both urban
and rural households and the de®nitions of medically
underserved regions may provide insights about the
10
See, for example, Project EAST Pro®les, a publication of
East Carolina University, September 1993.

Table 4
Counties included in surveya
County

1990 Population Observations Underserved

Beaufort
Bertie
Bladen
Brunswick
Camden
Carteret
Chowan
Columbus
Craven
Cumberland
Currituck
Dare
Duplin
Edgecombe
Gates
Greene
Halifax
Harnett
Hertford
Hoke
Hyde
Johnston
Jones
Lenoir
Martin
Nash
New Hanover
Northampton
Onslow
Pamlico
Pasquotank
Pender
Perquimans
Pitt
Robeson
Sampson
Scotland
Tyrrell
Washington
Wayne
Wilson

42,283
20,388
28,663
50,985
5904
52,553
13,506
49,587
81,613
274,713
13,736
22,746
39,995
56,692
9305
15,385
55,516
67,833
22,523
22,856
5411
81,306
9414
57,274
25,078
76,677
120,284
20,798
149,838
11,368
31,298
28,855
10,447
108,480
105,170
47,297
33,763
3856
13,997
104,666
66,061
2,060,110

Total

76
27
45
55
14
85
27
79
158
390
22
33
80
117
16
45
83
116
34
41
5
142
10
103
45
109
217
31
176
20
50
59
18
229
165
81
42
3
27
181
113
3369

no
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
no

a

Populations are from the 1990 Census of Population and
Housing. A county is underserved if there are fewer than one
primary care physician per 3500 individuals.

migration of households and ®rms in pursuit of physicians. Future wage-amenity models that include medical care inputs could also include measures of
environmental health amenities in order to test for the
substitutability of averting behavior and medical care.
Finally, much research has determined that the valuation of amenities is determined in both labor and land
markets. Our wage-amenity models include a proxy
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variable for the housing market. Future research
should employ a multi-market approach, if data
allows, to determine the full eect of medical care
inputs on quality of life.
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